In 2001 Ritter on two occasions was detained and later arrested on charges of soliciting minors for sex on the Internet that were both dismissed. Then in May 1984 he was commissioned as an intelligence officer in the United States Marine Corps. He served as the lead analyst for the Marine Corps Rapid Deployment Force concerning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq War.Ritter was born into a military family in 1961 in Gainesville, Florida. Ritter's academic work focused on the Basmachi resistance movement in Soviet Central Asia during the 1920s and 1930s, and on the Basmachi commanders Fazail Maksum and Ibrahim Bek.He became a popular anti-war figure and talk show commentator.In a 2005 interview Ritter criticized the Clinton administration's use of a blocked inspection of a Ba'ath party headquarters to justify Operation Desert Fox, a three-day bombing campaign in December 1998 that saw inspectors withdrawn from Iraq where they would not return until late 2002.Ritter was amongst a group of UNSCOM weapons inspectors that regularly took Lockheed U-2 imagery to Israel for analysis, as UNSCOM was not getting sufficient analysis assistance from the U. The first reports were passed to the British sometime in February of 1998.There was a detailed planning meeting in June of 1998, and I resigned in August of 1998.But you know the United States government ordered the inspectors to withdraw from the modalities without conferring with the Security Council. Iraqis were saying, "We're playing by the rules, why aren't you?
He was chief inspector in fourteen of the more than thirty inspection missions in which he participated. He said that he supported this, and we initiated a cooperation that was very short-lived.The ten crates of missile parts were stashed in a basement of the Baghdad headquarters of Saddam's own Ba'ath party.If we could achieve surprise and surround the site before the Iraqis could evacuate the crates, we would obtain the ultimate catch-22 situation: let us inside as promised and we would find the prohibited material; bar our entry and violate the Kofi Annan compromise, and in the process invite a devastating air strike by the United States.That may have been somewhat naive, but I firmly believed, I wrote, that UNSCOM was fighting for its very existence as a meaningful disarmament body, and inspections aimed at uncovering concealment remained imperative.It was a fight worth fighting, I said, recommending that we go ahead with the planned inspections regardless of the naysayers, though not without continuing to seek support.